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ABSTRACT
This article examines how transnational labor migrants to Russia 
from the five former Soviet Union countries – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – identify themselves in social 
media. The authors combine Rogers Brubaker’s theory of identifications 
with Randall Collins’ interaction ritual theory to study migrants’ online 
interactions in the largest Russian social media (VK.com). They 
observed online interactions in 23 groups. The article illuminates how 
normative and policy contexts affect the Russian Federation’s migration 
processes through a detailed discussion of migrants’ everyday online 
interactions. Results reveal common and country-specific identifications 
of migrants in their online interactions. Migrants from Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan employ identifications connected to diasporic connections. 
Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in their 
identifications refer to low-skilled labor migration to Russia as a fact, a 
subject for assessment, and as a unifying category. For these countries, 
the present and the future of the nation is discussed in the framework of 
evaluation of mass immigration to Russia. 
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Introduction
Setting the Problem
The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the appearance of new states and state 
borders. Russia has become a recipient country for many migrants, mostly from the 
former Soviet Union (fSU) countries. Today Russia is the largest recipient country 
in the region and one of the largest in the world. According to the United Nations 
International Migration report, Russia was a number four country among places of 
destination for international migrants in 2017 (United Nations, 2017). In the 1990s, 
those who moved to Russia were predominantly ethnic Russians and Russophone 
citizens who wanted to resettle in Russia (Brubaker, 1995). However, since the end of 
the 1990s, migration to Russia is primarily labor migration of those who return or plan 
to return to their homelands (Malakhov, 2014; Sadovskaya, 2013). 
Post-Soviet migration is a path-dependent process and, to a certain extent, it 
reproduces the Soviet trends. The post-Soviet region continues to be quite self-
centered in terms of migration despite of new migration flows (Stepanov, 2018). 
Massive labor migration to Russia from Central Asian and Caucasian states succeeds 
migration from “the Soviet South”/“southern republics” to Moscow and Leningrad 
(Sahadeo, 2019). Old territorial divisions and classifications of “nationalities” (Martin, 
2001) remain significant for developing state policies dealing with migration, as well 
as for everyday life of migrants. Ethnic classifications (nationalities), the ideology of 
“the friendship of the peoples”, and Russian language as the language of intercultural 
communication constitute common frames for everyday interactions between migrants 
in Russia (Libman & Obydenkova, 2019; Sanders, 2017). Soviet administrative 
policies shaped the territorial and national boundaries in such a way that today the 
distinction between internal and international migrants is blurred. In Russia, migrants 
from the national republics of North Caucasus and international migrants from South 
Caucasus and Central Asia are often perceived by local Russian residents as “visible 
migrants”, or just “migrants” (Mukomel, 2016).
At the same time, other kinds of identities, such as religion and orientations 
towards socio-cultural and historical specifics that formed the reality of nation-building 
before the Soviet period, acquire their significance in post-Soviet states (Aitamurto, 
2019; Sullivan, 1995). These identities are important for migrants, because through 
them, migrants categorize themselves, but also are categorized by the local residents 
or by the state officials as Muslims, Asians, non-Westerners, Turks, etc. Islam has a 
particular significance for migrants from Central Asia and Caucuses as it provides 
both a way of integration into the Russian society, and a way to dissociate from the 
“Russian mainstream” (Di Puppo & Schmoller, 2018).
The intensity of migration flows exerts a substantial influence on the nation-
building processes in the fSU countries (Fabrykant, 2017; Laruelle, 2009). Issues 
of nationalism and ethnicity in the fSU countries are linked to religion, race, and 
racialization in a complex and ambiguous way, particularly in the case of Islam (Abashin, 
2016; Aitamurto, 2019; Zakharov, 2015). Russian nationalism is simultaneously 
characterized by modernization and nostalgia, striving for geopolitical influence and 
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xenophobia, promoting the nation-state and empire; these contradictions coexist 
with a “concentric logic” of “Russianness” with ethnic Russians at the core (Laruelle, 
2009). In Central Asian and South Caucasian states, interactions between language 
(dialect), intra-state region, urban-rural division, nationality, religion and locality/
kinship constitute complex patterns of differences in nation-building (Brubaker, 2011; 
Faranda & Nolle, 2011; Pinchuk & Minyazhev , 2017; Reeves, 2019a; Utyasheva, 2018). 
In this article, we address the following puzzle. In the situation of mass labor 
migration to Russia from the fSU countries, various categories could be used for the 
purposes of migrants’ identification – by themselves and by others. Some of these 
categories, such as nationality, are inherited from the Soviet past. Other categories, 
such as religion, belong both to the pre- and post-Soviet periods. Which of these 
categories are relevant for migrants in their everyday interactions?
The research question we address is twofold. First, our focus is on migrants’ 
identifications1 in online interactions. In Russia, as well as in other parts of the world, 
staying online is an integral part of migrants’ lives (Reeves, 2016). Nowadays much 
of migrants’ everyday interactions happen online, which in turn shapes the reality of 
their identifications. Social media provide migrants with tools to stay connected with 
relatives and friends in their homeland as well as to solve everyday life problems in 
the host society (Andersson, 2019). Online technologies support various migrants’ 
activities and social formations, from family transactions to diasporic organizations 
(Brinkerhoff, 2009; Madianou & Miller, 2012). Therefore, it is relevant to ask how 
migrants identify themselves online. 
Second, we explore the identifications of migrants from five post-Soviet states: 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They have important 
similarities and differences as countries of origin of migration to Russia.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are among 
seven leading countries of origin for migration flows to Russia (the other two are 
China and Ukraine). In 2019, more than 19.5 million international migrants entered 
Russia, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (2020). 
More than 4.8 million migrants were citizens of Uzbekistan, about 2.8 million were 
from Tajikistan, and more than a million from Kyrgyzstan. About 0.7 million migrants 
were citizens of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The goals of migration, as indicated 
by migrants themselves in official documents, are partly similar and partly different 
for the countries under consideration. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan are predominantly labor migrants, while for migrants from Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan work is one of the main aims of migration. The most popular reason to 
emigrate for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is “work”. For migrants 
from Azerbaijan, the two main goals are “private affairs”2 and “work”. For migrants 
from Kazakhstan, the most popular goal is “private affairs”, followed by “work”, and 
“education”.
1 We use the terms “identification” in accordance with Rogers Brubaker’s theory of ethnicity (2004). 
The theoretical framework of the paper is discussed below in details.
2 We believe this goal embraces different kinds of migration, including informal labor migration.
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These five countries share two important characteristics as the countries of origin. 
First, they are countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Second, migrants 
from these countries are predominantly “visible” migrants. Religion is one of the key 
characteristics used for the identification of migrants in post-Soviet Russia (Sokolov, 
2017; Turaeva, 2019). Visibility is highly significant for migrants’ perception by the 
Russian officials and the public in general (Chandler, 2011; Sokolov, 2017).
At the same time, citizens from these countries experience different official 
regulations and migration policies in Russia. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the 
member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), so their citizens enjoy a 
privileged access to Russia’s labor market in comparison with migrants from Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, Kazakhstan is both a sending and a recipient 
country. It is a place of destination for many labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan (Laruelle, 2013). Finally, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan present regional diversity at both inter-state level (Central 
Asia and Caucasus) and sub-state levels (Fergana and Pamir regions, among others).
Literature Overview
Research materials that have already been published characterize a variety of ways 
of how migrants identify themselves and how they are identified by others in the fSU 
countries. Identification could be based on nationality (ethnicity), religion, citizenship, 
the region inside the state, the larger region (Central Asia, Caucasus), type of work, 
etc. Some of these characteristics are directly inherited from the Soviet time, or even in 
the earlier periods, some became relevant only after the USSR’s breakdown. Different 
actors in different post-Soviet states have used different combinations of these 
characteristics in their claims to construct their identity.
In Russia, labor migrants identify themselves in various ways that extend beyond 
nationality and citizenship. Sometimes their identifications are related to labor: migrants 
identify themselves as “hard workers” (Ni & Lisitsyn, 2017). Another identification is 
religion intersected with nation and region in various ways, for example as “Central 
Asia Muslims” (Turaeva, 2019) or “Tajiks are the strongest believers” (Roshe, 2018). 
A person from a local village/mahalla might also be a kind of identification (Urinboyev, 
2017). Migrants’ identifications are influenced by the local residents’ attitudes towards 
migrants’ connections to ethnic hierarchies intertwined with job hierarchies, visibility, 
Russian language proficiency, affiliation to a broader ethnicity (such as being Slavs), 
and the region of origin. Kyrgyz migrants perceive their ethnic status as low but 
superior to Tajik and Uzbek migrants and associate their superiority with proficiency in 
Russian language (Gerber & Zavisca, 2020), while some Tajik migrants compensate 
their low status by positioning themselves as pious Muslims (Roshe, 2018). 
Migration research generally addresses three main topics: movement, control, 
and settlement (Kivisto & Faist, 2010). Movement refers to the aims and patterns of 
migration. Migration to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan is primarily labor migration, as we have already noticed. Labor 
migrants in Russia are oriented towards paychecks. They commonly face de-
qualification, informal employment, and poor labor conditions, while wages received 
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by the Russian and migrant workers are comparable (Mukomel, 2017). However, 
migrants’ aims may eventually be transformed: migrants return to their homelands 
and then move back to Russia, labor migration entails family migration and so on 
(Brednikova, 2017). Migration policies developed in the Russian Federation are strict 
and asymmetric: even a minor break of the legal rules means that a migrant has little 
chance to be legalized again (Kubal, 2016). Moreover, migrants often do not have a 
clear understanding of the Russian legislation (Varshaver, Rocheva, & Ivanova, 2017). 
A gap between formal and informal institutions leads to corruption and proliferation 
of migration-related businesses (Malakhov, 2014). Struggles for getting the proper 
documents are an important part of migrants’ everyday practices and interactions 
(Reeves, 2019b). These problems, however, are less significant for migrants from the 
member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. For them, the regulations and 
requirements to stay and work in Russia are more relaxed (Mukomel, 2017).
The issues of settlement concern migrants’ incorporation into host societies. 
Migrants from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are 
partly transnational migrants. Transnational social formations “consist of combinations 
of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations, 
and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two nation states” 
(Faist, 2013, p. 450). Transnational ties are typical for migrants from Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Abashin, 2017; Brednikova, 2017; Varshaver & Rocheva, 
2014) and occasionally occur for migrants from Azerbaijan (Braux, 2013; Pinchuk & 
Minyazhev , 2017) and Kazakhstan (Ryazantsev, 2016; Safonova, 2008). Migrants to 
Russia engage in transnational social formations by staying in touch with their relatives 
at home and with compatriots abroad, sending remittances, visiting home, presenting 
gifts to their friends in their country of origin and in Russia, and so on. Interactions with 
the country of origin and with compatriots in Russia are highly important for starting 
the migration process as well as for the settlement in a new environment (Abashin, 
2017; Lisitsyn & Stepanov, 2019; Pinchuk & Minyazhev, 2017). 
Thus, research findings on movement, control and settlement of migrants to 
Russia reveal three crucial sources for identification. They are class (labor status), 
citizenship and nation, respectively.
Interactions via social media constitute one of the most important sources of 
information and emotional support for migrants living in Russia. Social media are 
characterized by “scalable sociality”: “Social media [colonize] the space between 
traditional broadcast and private dyadic communication, providing people with a 
scale of group size and degrees of privacy that we have termed scalable sociality” 
(Miller et al., 2016, p. 9). Migrants to Russia use social media to stay in touch with 
relatives and friends in their homeland and in Russia (Ruget & Usmanalieva, 2019; 
Schröder, 2018; Urinboyev, 2017), as well as to exchange information and goods 
with strangers (Timoshkin, 2019). This scalability, together with the ubiquity of online 
connections make interactions on the social media of particular interest for studying 
migrants’ identifications. They also present the kind of data that is underappreciated 
in the studies of migrants’ everyday lives in Russia, so far dominated by interviews 
and observation.
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Theoretical Framework and Research Questions
This article looks at how inherited social categories and related symbols constitute 
resources for migrants’ identifications in online interactions. To analyze how ethnic, 
national, and other categories are used in online interactions of migrants, we combine 
several conceptual and theoretical sources. 
One source is the theory of ethnic and national identifications proposed by Rogers 
Brubaker (2004): “As a processual, active term, derived from a verb, ‘identification’ […] 
invites us to specify the agents that do the identifying” (p. 41). For Brubaker, to study 
ethnic, national and other identifications means to answer the following questions: 
How do people identify themselves? How do other people identify them? In what 
types of situations do ethnic, national and other social categories become resources 
for identifications? Answering these questions demands knowledge of historical 
and cultural contexts as well as details of everyday social encounters. Brubaker 
provides two key distinctions: (a) between self-identification and identification by other 
actors, and (b) between relational and categorical modes of identification. Relational 
identifications refer to the participation in a web of social relations; categorical 
identifications refer to the “membership in a class of persons sharing some categorical 
attribute (such as race, ethnicity, language, nationality, citizenship, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc.)” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 42). Our research focuses on migrants’ self-
identifications and external identifications of the categorical mode.
We base our argument also on the concept of “everyday nationalism” proposed 
by Paul Goode and David Stroup (2015). We focus on the “quotidian practices by which 
ethnic and national identities are elaborated, confirmed, reproduced, or challenged” 
(Goode & Stroup, 2015, p. 718) in contrast to institutional and discursive identifications 
in official documents, political texts, mass media, etc. Everyday/“private” aspects of 
nationalism in contemporary Russia seem to be quite distinct from the institutional 
ones and thus constitute a subject of special interest (Goode, 2017). However, our 
unit of analysis is not everyday practice as such, but the situation of interaction in 
the social media. Thus, the paper has a micro-sociological focus in contrast to the 
anthropological approach taken by Goode.
To study migrants’ interactions, we rely on the interaction ritual theory (IRT) by 
Randall Collins (2004). The IRT provides guiding principles for studying how cultural 
symbols gain relevance in interaction. The concept of the interaction ritual embraces 
a whole spectrum of interactions, from everyday talks to ceremonies. Interaction 
rituals, according to Collins, have four ingredients and four outcomes connected 
by a specific situational mechanism (Collins, 2004, pp. 47–49). Ritual ingredients 
are the group assembly, the group boundary to outsiders, the mutual focus of 
attention, and the shared mood. “As the persons become more tightly focused on 
their common activity, more aware of what each other is doing and feeling, and 
more aware of each other’s awareness, they experience their shared emotion more 
intensely, as it comes to dominate their awareness” (Collins, 2004, p. 48). Persons 
engage in common rhythms; rhythmic entrainment produces intersubjectivity and, 
for successful rituals, evolves into collective effervescence (Emile Durkheim’s 
term). Ritual outcomes are group solidarity, the emergence of group symbols, the 
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standards of morality towards the group and its symbols, and emotional energy in 
individuals. The latter is a feeling of enthusiasm about the interaction that pushes 
individuals to participate in similar interactions in the future. The importance of 
symbols for individuals tends to fade away gradually; hence, symbols need to be 
recharged in new interactions. Thus, according to Collins, interactions tend to form 
patterns in time, interaction ritual chains.
Additionally, we apply the concept of attention space also developed by Collins 
(1998; 2004). Attention space characterizes symbols and ideas that are relevant for a 
community and are used in its interactions and discourses. There are two important 
observations about attention space: it is limited, and it is structured. First, several 
symbols are at the center of attention while others are employed marginally, in an 
episodic way. Second, symbols and ideas are interrelated: some are in opposition, 
some are in affinity. The concept of attention space helps to combine Collins’s and 
Brubaker’s theoretical perspectives. Who and what situational mechanisms make 
limited attention in interaction focused on the ethnic, national, religious or other social 
categories? This question combines Collins’s interactional analysis with Brubaker’s 
interest to mechanisms of group formation.
To analyze online interactions of migrants as interaction rituals we rely on 
conceptual and methodological adaptations of the IRT for studying online interactions 
provided by Paul DiMaggio and his colleagues (DiMaggio, Bernier, Heckscher, & 
Mimno, 2019). The authors combine Collins’s ideas with a theory of speech genres 
developed by Mikhail Bakhtin in order to explore how mutual focus of attention, shared 
mood, and rhythmic entrainment exist in posts, comments, and threads. In particular, 
we consider national, ethnic and other social categories as potential group symbols.
Research materials that have already been published in combination with the 
formulated theoretical framework allow us to formulate five research questions for this 
study: 
1) What social categories do migrants to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan employ in their attempts to identify 
themselves and to be identified by others in online interactions?
2) How are these categories related to each other? Are they used individually, 
or are there elective affinities between social categories exercised for the 
purposes of identifications?
3) Do identifications differ for migrants from different countries?
4) Do they differ for self-identifications and external identifications?
5) What are the typical situations when the usage of “migrant” category is 
relevant?
Data and Methods
The source of empirical data are interactions in a sample of online groups found on 
the social media. Specifically, we study migrants’ interactions in VK.com (VK is short 
for its original name Vkontakte), Russia’a most popular social network and one of the 
most popular in the fSU countries (Timoshkin, 2019). The group is a specific form 
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of interaction that enables users to communicate with a wide range of people, from 
friends to strangers. Our sampling of groups was organized in two steps. 
First, in January-February 2020, we searched for groups that contain the 
morphemes migrant*/migrat*, azer*, kazakh*, kyrgyz*, tajik*, uzbek* in their titles. To 
embrace regional and ethnic diversity of sending countries, we also included such 
morphemes as badakshan*, dungan*, fergan*, karalakalpak*, pamir*, talysh*, and 
uyghur*. The search was conducted in the Russian language for all morphemes 
and then additionally in the national languages for morphemes migrant*/migrat* and 
the name of the nation3. We looked through all the groups displayed in VK’s search 
output and selected groups of three types: (1) groups related to migrant activities; (2) 
20 largest groups that provide information about the country of origin for each nation 
(both for Russian and for the national language); (3) groups that discuss Islam for each 
nation. More than 2000 groups were selected at this stage.
Second, in March 2020, we applied network analysis for further sampling4. We 
considered common members of two groups as a link between them. Network analysis 
was conducted for the groups with different morphemes in titles, as well as for all 
groups together. Based on the results of the network analysis, we selected 23 groups 
based on (a) centrality; (b) relevance for migration issues; (c) intensity of interactions 
in a group; (d) diversity of groups (including clusterizations)5.
The online groups that were included in our study can be divided into four types. 
The first type is a community of migrants from one country that settled in a specific 
Russian city. Three Kyrgyz, one Tajik, and two Kazakh groups belong to this type6. 
Migrants’ communities provide a space for casual interactions, mutual assistance, 
and information exchanges. The second type is an information group. It contains 
information on various topics about a country of origin, including migration issues. This 
type is represented by one Kyrgyz group; two Tajiks groups (one of which is focused 
on the history of Tajikistan); four Uzbeks groups (with different target audiences: 
Uzbek youth outside the country, immigrants who left the country in the 1990s, mixed 
audiences); one Kazakh  group; and two Azerbaijani groups. The third type consists 
of the groups of national cultural organizations in Russian cities. It embraces one 
Azerbaijani and two Kazakh groups. The fourth type consists of groups devoted to 
legal assistance/mutual assistance for migrants to Russia from different countries. 
3 For kazakh* we specified Russia as a country due to larger amount of groups with this morpheme 
in title. For other morphemes a country was not specified.
4 We would like to thank Anastasia Kitaeva for her assistance in conducting network analysis.
5 We used the online service for social network communities analysis Popsters (https://popsters.
com/) to review the groups’ content and intensity of interactions and then to select the posts. The groups 
are: https://vk.com/podsluskakgz; https://vk.com/just_sss; https://vk.com/in_kyrgyzstan; https://vk.com/
piterskiekyrgyzy; https://vk.com/typicaltashkent; https://vk.com/uzbeki_so_vsego_mira; https://vk.com/
tashkent2x2; https://vk.com/uzbek.mahalla; https://vk.com/vatantj; https://vk.com/history_of_tajikistan01; 
https://vk.com/tadjiki1; https://vk.com/kazahi_omska; https://vk.com/club45832163; https://vk.com/
murager_moscow; https://vk.com/znewskz; https://vk.com/kazakh_in_moscow; https://vk.com/amor.
official; https://vk.com/azerbaycan_tradition; https://vk.com/azerbaycan; https://vk.com/rossiyavsem; 
https://vk.com/migroland; https://vk.com/vestimigranta; https://vk.com/migrant_russia 
6 One of the Kazakh groups is a group for Russophones in Kazakhstan who plan to resettle in 
Russia.
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This type includes four groups selected on the basis of the morpheme migrant*/
migrat*. These groups are of different sizes and orientations, from pragmatic issues to 
defense of migrants’ rights. Interactions in the former three types of groups combine, 
in different parts, the Russian language and the national languages7. Interactions in 
the fourth type are entirely in Russian.
The main research method of this study was online observation. We investigated 
online interactions in these groups in April 2020. Specifically, we observed 
interactions that took place during the period from January 2019 to April 20208. In the 
study, we adopted the methodology developed by DiMaggio et al. (2019). The unit 
of observation is a post along with its thread of comments. We focused on the posts 
that triggered discussions among users: for small and medium groups, we analyzed 
the posts with 10 or more comments; for large groups, we analyzed the posts with 20 
or more comments. Moreover, our observation was focused only on the interactions 
that comprise migrants’ identifications. In total, 578 posts were analyzed, along with 
their threads.
During the observation, we identified the symbolic focus of the original post, 
symbolic foci of the thread, as well as self-identifications and external identifications 
applied by the users. Then prevalent and auxiliary types of identifications were 
revealed, as well as typical situations of interaction. Our analysis is qualitative, highly 
dependent on the context of interactions in a particular group. Thus, in the presentation 
of our results we provide and discuss observations of interactions exemplary for all 
groups or for a specific type of groups.
Results
Common Prevalent Identifications: Between Market, State and Nation
Five common prevalent identifications characterize migrants’ interactions in online 
groups. These identifications are common as they occur in all types of groups. They 
are prevalent as they occur regularly and were a topic for focused discussions. Two 
identifications deal with a migrant as a person who moves from one country to another. 
Three more identifications cover a migrant’s settlement in Russia. For the latter self-
identifications are tightly intertwined with external identifications.
The first prevalent identification is “migration as economic necessity”. It relates 
labor migration to economic or political situation in the country of origin, and image 
of the nation depends on how migration to Russia is evaluated. This identification 
could be further specified in two matters. First, the definition of a migrant can be 
either derogatory (abusive) or neutral/moderately positive, and this issue is debatable 
by migrants themselves. The illustration is the following interaction from an Uzbek 
information group:
7 We used Google Translate (https://translate.google.com) to comprehend the statements that are 
in the national languages.
8 For two groups the period of observation was January 2017 – April 2017; we extended the period 
to embrace more activities in the groups.
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Observation 19
Post: And here is the whole truth about the totalitarian regime  Mirziev called 
Karimov’s rule “an era of fear” [...]
Comment: It is necessary to twist the economic balance so that the Uzbeks 
would live better, and they would not call us gastarbeiters!!!!
Reply to comment: Those who call us gastarbeiters have megalomania. The 
Russians who go to work to the North, abroad, are also treated like slaves. 
Russians and other nationalities have been working with us for more than 70 
years, but no one has ever treated them like slaves and they have never been 
called gastarbeiters. I mean, here, in Uzbekistan. So, I think any nation and any 
work deserves respect. 
Second, being a migrant could be associated with returning to homeland or 
with staying in Russia, and it is not obvious what place and what decision is better. 
Consider an observation from a Kyrgyz migrant community:
Observation 2
Post: I’ll leave it here for myself [...] Kyrgyzstan will not develop [...]. In the Kyrgyz 
Republic, every family has someone who left country as a migrant. In some 
families two or three persons work abroad. The people are coping somehow [...]. 
The people are trying to get along [...]. But our “Elite” have hands that grow out of 
their ass and slime instead of brains [...].
Comment: I fully agree with the author; I have not lived in the Kyrgyz Republic 
for 6–7 years. And nothing has changed during this time here. I also had a desire 
to fly back from the airport. I won’t say that in Russia or in other countries we feel 
good. But how good it would be if you worked in your hometown and your close 
relatives were nearby [...].
Comment: I partially agree, but in Kyrgyzstan people also work to buy apartments, 
and other things too. If we were taught from childhood that Kyrgyzstan is the 
best place in the world, this is our Motherland and we must find our place here, 
then everyone would remain there. We all think that Russia is better, and we are 
accustomed to the local situation [in Russia], we forget and not fulfil our traditions, 
we think that “we live freely without obligations”, how bitterly we are mistaken. If 
we came home and worked hardly like in Russia, it would be different, but we are 
not able to do this [...].
9 Examples of observations (posts and comments) are presented in fragments. Translation into 
English preserves the meaning of the statements. However, we did not attempt to hold the slang or specific 
mistakes of the original comments and posts.
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Comment: No one chose where he was born, it became easier for us to complain 
about one’s own life and to look for those who are guilty than to fight and to move, 
to find solutions to problems!!! As long as you have health and brains in place, 
you can work and earn money not only in Kyrgyzstan but also in Africa, for this 
you need only confidence and aspiration!
The second prevalent identification is “a migrant subject to state regulations”. This 
identification is typically discussed in connection with the EEU and with requirements 
for obtaining Russian citizenship. Moreover, citizenship is spontaneously associated 
with ethnicity, in a variety of migrants’ interactions, both in national groups and in 
legal assistance groups. The logic of nationality and the logic of citizenship mismatch. 
This is articulated in claims to simplify requirements for Russian citizenship for 
“Russians”, in accusations of discrimination against non-Slavs, as well as in assertions 
that nationality actually does not matter for migration regulations. To illustrate this 
incongruity let us refer to two posts with opposite logics, both are from groups of legal 
assistance:
Observation 3
Post: The Federation Council of the Russian Federation called on the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs to deal with companies that extort money from migrants [...]. On 
March 11, the Federation Council approved a law that abolishes the obligation to 
pass the Russian language exam for residents of Belarus and Ukraine who are 
native speakers [...].
Comment: And to other migrants from Central Asia? If you abolish it, do it for all. 
They again divide people into Slavs and non-Russian, yeah.
Observation 410 
Post: A letter was sent to me by mail. “[…] May be, we will try to write a collective 
appeal to Putin and to ask him to supplement the second law, on obtaining a 
Russian passport in a simplified way by amendments about Ukrainian citizens 
living in the Russian Federation with a [legal] status (temporary asylum, temporary 
residence permit, residence permit), but with propiska in Donetsk and Lugansk 
region? […]” Electronic signatures will not work. But, as far as I remember, is 
there some kind of official/semi-official website for petitions? Do you believe in 
success of this idea, in general?
Comment: You want to give citizenship to Ukrainians but what about [ethnic] 
Russians? How is it for them? In common order? Justice is off the hook.
10 This observation comes from a group of legal assistance for migrants from different countries. 
That is why issues of people from Donetsk and Lugansk region are discussed below together with migration 
from Central Asia.
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Reply to comment: This is not the point. The fact is that the Donetsk region was 
divided in into parts, into us and them.
Reply to comment: Ukrainians have their homeland Ukraine, we have Russia 
[...]; why to solve everything at the expense of us? Where is the simplification for 
us? We didn’t ride on the Maidan [...], we were denigrated and kicked off [...] now 
give citizenship to all Ukrainians [...]. And what about us? Or should we suffer for 
years? And to stand in the queues with Uzbeks and Tajiks on a common basis?
The third prevalent identification is “a migrant representing the nation”. In national 
information groups it is presented in the news about migrant heroes and migrant 
criminals. It constitutes the basis for solidarity or splits in online discussions where 
self-identifications and external identifications are intertwined (see Observations 7 
and 8 below). In migrants’ communities, there are typically discussions and criticism 
(or, less often, praise) of migrants’ behavior (i.e. everyday practices) and demands to 
behave properly. The argument is that the behavior of one Kyrgyz in Russia is a ground 
for judgment about all Kyrgyz (the same for Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.). This identification 
is combined sometimes with characterization of migrants as hillbilly insufficiently 
imbued with urban culture. Consider, as an example, how this kind of self-identification 
arises in response to external identification in the Kyrgyz migrant community:
Observation 5
Post: This is to a post about the attitude of [ethnic] Russians towards us! It’s our 
own fault that they treat us like that. Firstly, our country, to put it mildly, is weak. 
Secondly, our people in Moscow and other Russian cities behave very indecently. 
They are very arrogant and immediately begin to swear from a scratch [...].
Comment: In principle, there are people who behave just wildly, but again, not all.
Comment: Ahahw author is a moron! I will provide arguments about the post in 
private message. Nothing personal, your worldview is just so funny, I can’t call 
you anything else.
Comment: As for arrogance, I agree, I talked with a colleague, she thought that 
I was from Kazakhstan and said that the Kyrgyz are arrogant and very poor-
educated [...], that many Kyrgyz do not know the Russian language [...]; the author 
of the post really got the point. I think this is because most of the migrants are 
from villages [...].
The fourth prevalent identification is “a migrant as a native speaker”. There are 
claims on VK groups that migrants should use their native language. These claims 
are often related to fear of their own culture and language (see Observations 9 and 12 
below).
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The fifth prevalent identification is “a migrant as inferior to local people”. It relates 
to the following topics: difficulties in employment, racial profiling, biased media, and 
to a general belief that Russians consider migrants as second-rate people. This 
self-identification is supported by two kinds of external identifications. The first one 
is provocations against migrants in online groups that do or do not result in further 
discussions. The second one is the accusation of migrants in hostility to Russians 
that may turn into a squabble fueled by mutual diminishment of nationalities. 
Counterarguments against radical nationalism in such discussions often arise from 
the Soviet notion of “the friendship of the peoples”. The most vivid example that is 
characteristic for Uzbek and Tajik groups are claims that these nations expelled the 
Russians in 1990s. Here is a typical interaction from a Tajik information group:
Observation 6
Post: January 1, 2020, the procedure for obtaining quotas [for labor migrants] [...].
Comment: Stop going to Russia and acting like filth. Live at your own home.
Reply to comment: Why so rude? I think you are not to decide for someone 
where to live and where to go. It is a choice for any citizen [...].
Reply to comment: I know you hypocrites. I have a girlfriend from Uzbekistan. 
She told how they terrified the Russians back in the 90s. After they stabbed 
her uncle, they had to leave. And before that they had always said, they said 
“Russians go home”. So get out of here, goddamn Nazis.
Reply to comment: How old are you? Probably, you’ve heard that then everyone 
had troubles. The Union was disintegrating. There were clashes between people 
everywhere. According to the stories of elderly people, relatives, Uzbekistan, in 
particular, Tashkent City was built by the whole country, they sent professionals 
from all the national republics to rebuilt the City that was destroyed by the 
earthquake. So, it has become multinational. People lived well, friendly, nobody 
distinguished who is of what nationality, they learned the Russian language, and 
Russians learned the Uzbek language. You need to understand, there is no bad 
nations, all are good, it is just bad persons in every nation […].
Country-Specific Prevalent Identifications: Internal Differentiation
Prevalent country-specific identifications in migrants’ online interactions split the 
countries into two groups. One includes Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the 
other embraces Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
The key category for the split is “low-qualified labor migrants from Central 
Asia”. “Central Asia” typically refers to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This 
category is employed for self-identifications as well as for external identifications 
and constitutes a basis for internal differentiation. For migrants from Uzbekistan, 
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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, it acts both as a unifying identification (occasionally in 
combination with identification as a Muslim) and as an object of detachment. The 
illustrations are the following interactions from the information groups of Uzbeks and 
Tajiks, respectively:
Observation 7
Post: The heroism of the Uzbeks and Tajiks is not revealed! April 8 nursing 
home burned down! Tajiks and Uzbeks came running to the rescue from a 
neighboring dormitory for labor migrants, they risked their lives and saved 
30 people, but there’s no word about them on [Russian] TV! Many thanks them 
and their parents!
Comment: And who said that they will show Muslims on TV? This is media, they 
can show only when they do bad things, and they call them terrorists, and when 
their own people do it, they call it hooliganism, or a crazy person. I live in Russia 
for a long time and I have never seen a TV program that depict Muslims in a good 
way! [...]
Comment: Our peoples have always been solid, Uzbeks, Tajiks, all of Central 
Asia. We should have joined a long time ago, we need to create a union.
Observation 8
Post: About hatred of Tajiks [...]. How long will Tajiks be accused of all black 
deeds occurring in Russia?! When anything goes wrong, just blame a Tajik [...]. 
The janitor beat up the teenager, and they called him Tajik for almost the entire 
TV program, which he is not, then at the end it turns out that it was Uzbek [...] and 
the Uzbek diaspora “bought out” their janitor for 50 000 rubles. Is it fine? Why to 
blame Tajiks? [...]
Comment: Tajiks and Uzbeks are not just two different nations; they are two 
different races. Russians, you are so stupid that you don’t distinguish races, and 
there are only four of them on Earth.
For migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, “low-qualified labor migrants from 
Central Asia” is an external identification. Consider two examples from the Kazakh 
and Azerbaijani groups, respectively:
Observation 9
Post: A great film about how to be a Kazakh, no matter where you live! We advise 
to watch it, especially for those who do not know for what and why they need to 
know the language, to honor the traditions and what to pass on to children.
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Comment: Russian Kazakhs are the most non-patriotic Kazakhs (Russified).
Reply to comment: I do not agree with you! Today, my brother told me – the guy 
from Kazakhstan works with him at the factory, my brother spoke Kazakh with 
him, and he said – I don’t understand, no one speaks Kazakh in our family. And 
it’s kind of weird.
Reply to comment: There is no gastarbeiters among Kazakhs, this Kazakh is 
am improper Kazakh.
Observation 10
Post: The influx of migrants to Russia has fallen to a minimum for the entire 
post-Soviet period […].
Comment: It’s just that all these migrants have already bought citizenship of the 
Russian Federation, now every second Tajik has citizenship.
Comment: I don’t know where they decreased in numbers, today I was driving 
past the migration service, and it was crowded. Five hundred people stood. And 
all were Uzbeks or Kyrgyz. This is in April, and soon there will be warmer and 
there will be more of them. It seems to me that though the cost of a patent has 
been raised and laws are constantly changing against them, those who are in 
need go here, they are trying their best, work for a penny to somehow feed their 
family at home. I feel pity for those people.
“A member of the diaspora” is a crucial self-identification for migrants from 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This identification shapes a group border that separates 
“members of the diaspora” from “low-qualified labor migrants”, or “gastarbeiters”. For 
Azerbaijani diasporic identification is not specified further. For Kazakhs the division 
within the diaspora between Russian Kazakhs and Kazakhstan Kazakhs turns out 
to be salient (see Observation 9).
These two identifications, “low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia” and 
“members of the diaspora”, imply different uses of ethnic categorizations. On the one 
hand, discussions of everyday problems of labor migrants amalgamate symbols of 
class, social status, religion and ethnicity. Strong ethnic categorizations arise here 
mainly in response to violation of moral boundaries: for example, when someone 
generalizes one’s own negative experience of interaction with “Kyrgyzs”, “Tajiks” or 
“Uzbeks” to the entire nation. On the other hand, ethnic categorizations strengthen 
transnational diasporic networks. Being “Azerbaijani” or “Kazakh” means learning 
native language and culture, as well as being aware of what is going on in the 
Homeland. Such categorizations are constructed through symbols that refer to the 
imagined community, from national culture to political debates.
338 Natalia D. Tregubova, Maxim L. Nee
Changing Identifications
Several discussions in VK groups were about migrants who change their identifications 
when they move to Russia. These discussions are of special interest because they 
reveal significant characteristics of migrants’ condition in Russia. Some of them are 
related to collective emotions, while others are just pragmatic. 
First, consider two observations from a Tajik information group.
Observation 11
Post: Pamir [a photo of a couple in national costumes].
Commentary: This is a group for Tajiks, they [Pamiris] don’t consider themselves 
as Tajiks when they arrive to Russia or other countries [...].
Reply to comment: Yes, we are not Tajiks, we are Pamiris. With a capital letter. 
We have a different civilization, tradition, language, and everything else, and 
do not discuss us, ok. Tajikistan is a state for us, not a home, our home is in 
the mountains, and your city will be destroyed. The mountains will remain, the 
Pamir is the Roof of the world, the world will be destroyed and the Roof will 
remain.
Reply to comment: I know what culture you have in the Pamirs, all men and 
women sleep in one place, this is a fact [...]. Look at what you are, Tajikistan gives 
you a passport, you still don’t consider yourself a Tajik only in Russia or in other 
countries, well, try it in Dushanbe, you are cowards.
Reply to comment: why do you need a Tajik passport if you do not consider 
yourself to be Tajiks.
Observation 12
Post: [...] We endure humiliation from all and everywhere [in Russia]. But we are 
not averse to pretend to be Caucasians, wearing hats, dancing Lezginka, posing 
as Dagestani and Chechens. Our young people are not averse to showing 
strength to their fellow countrymen, arranging showdowns and humiliating their 
own blood brothers. [...] Find in yourself at least a little courage not to pretend 
to be someone you don’t know but to learn to support each other [...]. We are 
used to blame everything on our government. Maybe we just cannot admit our 
cowardice and helplessness?!
Comment: The author of the post, the majority here supports you, but this is 
the case here, we have always depended on the Russian Federation… and 
government of Tajikistan, as you can see, is inactive, so first you need to be 
independent from the Russian Federation.
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Comment: “Not to pretend to be someone you don’t know?” Why such a neglect 
for Caucasians. After all, it is clear whom and why they [Tajik migrants in Russia] 
are pretending to be.
Comment: You yourself say that the guys are pretending to be Caucasians, but 
you yourself write in Russian. So, you are pretending to be a Russian?
Both observations refer to change in self-identification related to external 
identifications in Russian society. However, these changes have different directions. 
Pamiri migrants in Russia are claimed to reveal their identity, whereas Tajik migrants 
are claimed to hide it. Observation 11 reveals a conflict between concepts of Tajik 
nation and Tajik citizenship for Pamiris. Migration to Russia seems to be liberating 
for them, as, it is argued, it allows for national self-identification that is possible in 
Tajikistan only in opposition to Tajik majority. Post in Observation 12, in contrast, 
accuses Tajiks in faking their identity to be more prestigious (Caucasians). Tajiks are 
considered here as having an inferior position in ethnic hierarchies, and Caucasians 
better as they have reputation of tough guys and are Russian citizens (Dagestani and 
Chechens are mentioned). At the same time, Caucasians are migrants from what was 
called the “Soviet South”, as Tajiks are, and here citizenship becomes less important 
than visibility and ethno-territorial divisions inherited from the Soviet past.
Juxtaposition of these two observations supports the statement about internal 
differentiation of migrants. Both transformations of identifications help to avoid being 
classified as “low-qualified labor migrants from Central Asia” that is associated with 
weakness and low position in Russian society. It is obvious in switch from “a Tajik” to 
“a Caucasian”, while “a Pamiri” seems to be exotic/less-accountable identification in 
Russia that is not strongly associated with labor migration. These observations also 
demonstrate that clash between national pride and “migrant” categorization is painful 
and fuels collective emotions from humiliation to rage.
At the same time, a change of identification could have pragmatic purposes 
connected with labor migration. Consider an observation from a Kyrgyz migrant 
community:
Observation 13
Post: Hello, a passport has found more than a week ago. If anyone knows anything 
about the owner, please contact me [...] [Photo of Kyrgyz passport].
Comment: Who is this Uzbek with a Kyrgyz passport?
Reply to comment: Kyrgyz Uzbek.
Reply to comment: I’ve heard that Uzbeks and Tajiks make fake [Kyrgyz] passports 
so as not to pay for a patent and work permit.
Reply to comment: Yes, it is true! And this is the state who allows it.
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Here the identification changes only in institutional contexts (for the police, the 
migration service, etc.) as citizens of Kyrgyzstan are subjects to much simple migration 
regulations. Thus, the citizenship has been changed, not ethnicity. Note, however, 
that the change of identification lies within the category “low-qualified labor migrants 
from Central Asia”. Probably, that is why it does not arouse emotional responses 
connected with ethnic hierarchies: neither “an Uzbek” nor “a Kyrgyz” seems to be 
better identification in Russian society.
Auxiliary Identifications
In addition to the identifications characterized above, we observed migrants’ 
identifications that are auxiliary: they did not occur regularly, or often, or are not a topic 
for focused discussions. 
There are several auxiliary self-identifications in migrants’ online interactions. 
They are:
• “Muslim migrants”. This identification is primarily connected to discussion of 
everyday religious practices. For Tajik and Uzbek groups, it is also concerns a 
discussion that Islam is easier to practice in Russia than in the country of origin 
due to strict regulation of Muslim practices by the state (especially in Tajikistan).
• “A person from a specific place” – city, town, village, or region (see 
Observation 11). This self-identification could also be combined with the 
emphasis on nation, such that “we are all Tajiks”.
• “Nostalgic migrants” identification arises in various situations, and it is of special 
relevance for Russophone immigrants from Uzbekistan to Russia who left the 
country in 1990s.
• A type of migration: educational or labor.
• “Too many migrants from my country”.
• Negative and positive auto-stereotypes. They are: “Your own people cannot be 
trusted” (observed in Kyrgyz and Kazakh online groups); “Tajiks are passive”; 
“Azerbaijanis are entrepreneurial, decent and solidary”; “there exists ‘warm’ 
Central Asian mentality” (observed in Uzbek groups); “Uzbeks are generous”.
Auxiliary external identifications are:
• Imputation of ethnicity to the opponent (observed for Russian, Armenian and 
Uzbek nationalities).
• “We-migrants are better than you-migrants”. This identification applies 
to migrants from Central Asia, and the arguments are: “Because we are 
Russian”/“we know the language”/“our behavior is proper” (see Observation 4 
above). This identification occurs spontaneously or in response to provocations, 
“migrants are not welcomed in Russia”.
• “A migrant obliged to Russian laws”. This identification appears in two forms: as 
a moral obligation to obey laws and as a righteous anger to unjust laws.
• “A hostage of the situation” due to the actions of the authorities or economic policies 
of Russia and/or the country of origin. It is simultaneously a self-identification and 
an external identification employed by advocated of migrants’ rights.
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Contexts of Identifications
Three more remarks about varying contexts of identifications in online interactions.
First, discrimination against migrants does not universally function as a collective 
symbol in migrants’ interactions. A significant part of interactions that we observed 
are pragmatic. Some interactions involve emotions that original posts do not intent to 
produce. Let us consider a post focused on the insult of a Kyrgyz migrant by a popular 
Russian talk-show host. Comments to this post do not demonstrate collective offence 
against Russia: commentators blame the person, discuss his actions in a pragmatic 
manner, or address their negative emotions to Kyrgyz authorities:
Observation 14
Post: Andrey Malakhov reacted to angry comments of the Kyrgyz people 
addressed to him. Russian TV-presenter Andrey Malakhov made a statement 
after the scandal with the comment about the Kyrgyz people […].
Comment: Well, he is partially right. Salary of doctors and teachers in Kyrgyzstan 
is tiny. Our elections: for 1000 soms11 you can buy a voice. Maybe those who are 
offended do not know how people live outside Bishkek.
Reply to comment: I did not hear him speaking. But what I’ve read – it did not 
offend me at all. I am more offended by the theft of the state budget, the venality 
of the authorities and Nazism.
Comment: Malakh, you are an oligarch whore.
Comment: What do you want from a person who “washed” other people’s lingerie 
and digs into it during all his professional life. Those who remember his program 
“Big wash” will understand what I mean and how it relates to this person.
Second, the Soviet type of identification – “the friendship of the peoples” policy 
in combination with “nationalities” classification – regularly arises in observed 
interactions. It is often presented in a truncated form, as a widespread judgment: 
“There are no bad nations, there are bad people”. However, some users directly refer to 
“the friendship of the peoples” and its implementation in Soviet history, as Observation 
6 above reveals.
Finally, the dynamics and the focal topics of interactions also depend on the 
characteristics of a particular online group: its size, audience, language, who can 
post, who can comment, and so on. Observations 3 and 4 (see above) are a good 
illustration. The observations are from two groups, both are legal assistance groups 
with active moderators. The first group is small. It is characterized by human rights 
rhetoric applied to low-qualified labor migrants in Russia. Interactions in this group 
often occur in broken Russian. The second group is large. It focuses on obtaining 
11 The som is the national currency of Kyrgyzstan.
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Russian permanent residency and citizenship and involves empathy over migrants’ 
troubles with these issues. It aims predominantly at migrants from the fSU countries, 
mainly at those for whom Russian is a native language. As Observations 3 and 
4 demonstrate, in both groups there is a transition from the terms of citizenship to 
the terms of nationality. However, due to differences in initial goals and the target 
audience of the groups, this transition moves in the opposite directions: to accusations 
of discrimination against “non-Slavs”, on the one hand, and to a call for privileges for 
“Russians”, on the other hand.
Discussion and Conclusions
Let us begin this section with the answers to the original research questions of this 
paper.
What social categories do migrants employ in their attempts to identify themselves 
and to be identified by others in online interactions?
Migrants to Russia from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan employ a diverse set of social categories in their identifications. The 
prevalent categories are citizenship, nationality, language abilities, migrant-ness, as 
well as the category “low-skilled labor migrants from Central Asia” that amalgamates 
class, visibility and a broader region. Auxiliary social categories are religion, inter-
state region, town/village/city of origin, urban/rural origin, tradition/modernity, broader 
ethnicity (such as Slavs) in connection with race and belonging to the Soviet culture. 
Minority status, the aim of migration and kinship are employed occasionally.
How are these categories related to each other? Are they used individually, or are 
there elective affinities between social categories exercised for the purposes of 
identifications?
There is an elective affinity that manifests itself in the category of “low-skilled labor 
migrants from Central Asia”. It exists in the interactions in all types of groups and provides 
the basis for internal differentiation between migrants. “Low-skilled labor migrants from 
Central Asia” are opposed, on the one hand, to visible, but not (necessarily) low-skilled 
members of the Kazakh and Azerbaijani diasporas and, on the other hand, to non-visible 
ethnic Russian and Russophone migrants from Central Asia.
Do identifications differ for migrants from different countries? 
There are substantial differences in identifications of migrants from different 
countries. Migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in their identifications 
refer to low-skilled labor migration to Russia as a fact, a subject for assessment, and 
on occasion as a unifying category. For these countries, the present and the future of 
the nation is discussed in the framework of evaluation of mass immigration to Russia. 
Migrants from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan employ identifications connected to 
diasporic connections. Furthermore, in Kazakhstan there is a clear division between 
Russian and Kazakhstan Kazakhs.
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Do identifications differ for self-identifications and external identifications?
External identifications and self-identifications are intertwined in typical 
discussions in VK groups. The perspective of Russian society on migrants is, as it 
were, built into the perception of migrants themselves.
What are the typical situations when the usage of “migrant” category is relevant?
There are three types of situations associated with the usage of the “migrant” 
category. They are connected with the market, state and nation, respectively. First, 
“migrant” is a synonym for “labor migrant” who moves to Russia due to economic 
necessity. Second, “migrant” is a citizen of the state subject to specific institutional 
regulations. Third, “migrant” is the Other, a representative of his/her nation in Russian 
society. The situation of the third type is primarily connected with three contexts: (a) 
discussions of migrants’ behavior in Russia; (b) discussions of discrimination by police 
and employers; (c) provocations against migrants in social media. We should also add 
that migrants themselves sometimes perceive migrants from a different country as 
the Others.
The analysis of migrants’ online interactions allows us to formulate the following 
conclusions:
1. “Low-qualified labor migration from the countries of Central Asia” (Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) is a key categorization for national and other 
identifications of residents of these countries (both migrants and non-migrants). 
In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the fact of labor migration to Russia 
is highly relevant for the evaluation of the nation and its further developments.
2. Migration to Russia from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan is fused with diasporic 
connections.
3. The issue of the language is highly significant for migrants’ identifications. The 
national language is often regarded as an indicator of belonging to a nation. 
The role of Russian language is ambivalent. It is perceived as a valuable 
competence for a migrant in Russia, yet as a threat to national culture as well. 
We believe this ambivalence is rooted in the legacies of the Soviet national 
politics and policies.
4. Current migration flows to Russia are related with migration processes that 
took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the countries of Central 
Asia (primarily, for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), the exodus of ethnic Russians 
in the 1990s is still important as a point of reference and evaluation of 
contemporary mass labor migration to Russia. At the same time, the Soviet 
type of identifications based on “nationalities” and “the friendship of the 
peoples” remains a reference point in discussions about migration.
How do these results supplement understanding of migration processes in post-
Soviet region? Let us return to the similarities and differences between the Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that were formulated in the first 
part of this paper.
The five countries can be structured into two classes: (a) Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan are characterized by huge labor migration to Russia, while (b) 
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Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan provide less migrants coming with diversity of objectives. 
Our study shows that for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan migration to Russia is closely 
connected with diasporic ties. Both Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis detach themselves 
from “gastarbeiters” who came from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Visibility of migrants from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan turns out to be important for identifications in online interactions. However, 
visibility is not equal to race: it acts as a combination of phenotype, fluency in 
Russian language, and migrants’ everyday practices. Visibility is also paired in online 
interactions to “invisibility” of ethnic Russian (Russophone) migrants from Central Asia.
Islam is present in observed online discourses to a varying degree and in 
different variations. Islam turns out to be more significant for image of a nation. In 
different cases it is related to a nation in different ways. Islam is a unifying category, 
however, for migrants it is typically an auxiliary identification. Two points are 
important here: (1) belief that Muslim migrants are not welcome in Russia; and (2) 
conception that Islam is easier to practice in Russia than at home (for migrants from 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan).
Differences in the migration regulations among the post-Soviet countries are 
frequently discussed in social media. However, they are often connected to nationality: 
from the migrants’ point of view, nationality is/should/should not be decisive for 
facilitation of migration legislation in Russia.
Regarding regional differences, we observe that “Central Asia” as an identification 
is widespread online while local identifications are not so important. Perhaps, this is 
due to the specifics of the studied groups that are primarily focused on nations.
Finally, transnationalism manifests itself in migrants’ online interactions in two 
basic ways: as transnational labor migration and as diaspora. Besides, there are traces 
of transnational citizenship in discussions about dual citizenship and about politics in 
both Russia and the country of origin. This conclusion complements scholarly literature 
on transnational migration in Russia that pays attention to transnational practices of 
labor migrants from Central Asia and considers relations with relatives and friends, not 
political activities, as the main type of transnational practices.
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